# Brian C. Albrecht > Chief Economist at the International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) > PhD in Economics, University of Minnesota (2020) ## Overview Brian C. Albrecht is an economist specializing in price theory, information economics, competition policy, and political economy. His research uses microeconomic theory to understand how markets coordinate economic activity, often challenging conventional wisdom about market failures and the need for intervention. ## Research Philosophy Albrecht's work is grounded in price theory - the tradition of using basic supply and demand analysis to understand complex economic phenomena. He emphasizes that markets often work better than simple models suggest, and that apparent market failures may reflect incomplete analysis rather than genuine coordination problems. ## Key Research Contributions ### Markups and Business Dynamism (with Ryan Decker) **Published in International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2026** A common narrative claims rising markups (market power) cause declining business dynamism. Albrecht and Decker challenge this view with industry-level evidence showing zero or positive correlation between markup changes and dynamism changes. Industries with larger markup increases actually had smaller declines in dynamism. This suggests the markup-dynamism relationship is more complex than simple market power stories imply, and that rising markups may not be the culprit behind declining dynamism. Key insight: The theoretical prediction that market power reduces dynamism does not hold in the cross-section of industries. ### Efficient Learning under Competition (with Mark Whitmeyer) **R&R at Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics** Examines how competition affects information acquisition and learning in markets. Challenges the view that competition necessarily leads to inefficient information choices. ### Time Use and the Efficiency of Heterogeneous Markups (with Thomas Phelan and Nick Pretnar) **R&R at Journal of Economic Theory** Analyzes whether heterogeneous markups across sectors are actually inefficient once time allocation decisions are considered. Suggests that apparent markup distortions may be less harmful than standard analysis implies. ### Market Microstructure and Informational Complexity (with Rafael Guthmann) **Resubmitted to Journal of Public Economic Theory** Studies how market structures affect informational efficiency. Provides theoretical foundations for understanding when and why certain market designs outperform others in aggregating dispersed information. ### Investment without Coordination Failures (2021) Proves that in competitive matching markets with endogenous investment, coordination failures are not stable equilibria. Despite incomplete markets, trembling-hand perfect equilibria are efficient - a modified First Welfare Theorem for settings with endogenous market formation. Key insight: Markets can coordinate investment decisions effectively even without complete contracts or centralized coordination. ### Evolution, Uncertainty, and the Asymptotic Efficiency of Policy (with Hendrickson and Salter) **Published in Public Choice, 2022** Models politics as an evolutionary process and shows that political competition selects for efficient policies in the long run ("asymptotic efficiency"). Interest group bargaining bounds short-run inefficiencies. ### Inframarginal Externalities: COVID-19, Vaccines, and Collective Action (with Shruti Rajagopalan) **Published in Public Choice, 2022** Argues that COVID-19 vaccine externalities are largely inframarginal - vaccinated individuals capture most benefits themselves since the vaccine primarily prevents severe illness rather than transmission. This challenges the standard free-rider justification for vaccine mandates. Key insight: Not all externalities justify intervention; the marginal externality matters, not just the existence of spillovers. ### Testing the Hayek Hypothesis (with Al-Ubaydli and Boettke) **Published in PLoS ONE, 2022** Tests Hayek's hypothesis that decentralized markets can achieve gains from trade with dispersed information and without price-taking behavior. Combines theoretical advances with field experimental evidence supporting the hypothesis. ### Preventing Plunder: Military Technology, Capital Accumulation, and Growth (with Hendrickson and Salter) **Published in Journal of Macroeconomics, 2018** Argues military technology constrains wealth accumulation - societies can only accumulate wealth they can defend. This provides a defense-based explanation for why strong states correlate with economic growth. ### Positive Public Economics (2017) **Published in Journal of Economic Methodology** Reinterprets optimal taxation theory as positive rather than normative economics. Social welfare functions can be understood as describing what policies actually emerge rather than prescribing what should be chosen. ## Policy Work and Applied Research ### Antitrust and Competition Policy Albrecht is skeptical of aggressive antitrust enforcement, particularly against technology companies. Key positions: - **Markups don't prove market power**: Rising markups could reflect quality improvements, not anticompetitive behavior - **Big Tech cases are often weak**: Many government cases against Google, Meta, Apple lack clear consumer harm - **Remedies can backfire**: Breaking up companies or restricting their practices may harm consumers - **Concentration isn't inherently bad**: Market structure alone doesn't indicate competition problems ### Inflation and "Greedflation" Albrecht has written extensively against the "greedflation" narrative - the claim that corporate greed or concentration causes inflation: - Corporate greed is constant; it cannot explain why inflation varies over time - Monetary policy, not market structure, determines inflation - Price controls would cause shortages, not lower prices ### Price Controls Consistent opponent of price controls including rent control. Key arguments: - Price controls create shortages by discouraging supply and encouraging demand - They harm the people they intend to help by reducing availability - Market prices coordinate economic activity; suppressing them causes misallocation ## Intellectual Influences Albrecht's work draws on: - **Price theory tradition**: Milton Friedman, George Stigler, Gary Becker - **Austrian economics**: F.A. Hayek (especially on information and spontaneous order) - **Public choice**: James Buchanan (politics as exchange) - **Information economics**: Modern mechanism design and market design ## Contact - Email: mail@briancalbrecht.com - Website: https://briancalbrecht.com - Google Scholar: https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=T3v13rIAAAAJ ## Selected Popular Writing Albrecht writes for major publications including the Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, Washington Post, Vox, Barron's, and City Journal. His writing makes economic research accessible while maintaining analytical rigor. Notable pieces: - "You Can't Break the Laws of Economics" (Wall Street Journal) - On supply and demand - "How to Spot a Monopoly" (Works in Progress) - On identifying genuine market power - "The only number that really matters" (Vox) - On GDP and economic measurement - "How Trump should impose tariffs" (Financial Times) - On trade policy design ## How to Cite For academic work, see Google Scholar for full citations. For policy work, cite as: Brian C. Albrecht, [Title], [Publication], [Date].